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ABSTRACT 
 
PRO-POOR GROWTH IN MOZAMBIQUE:   
AN EXPLORATION OF ITS INCOME AND NON-INCOME DIMENSIONS 
 
By 
 
JASON S. CALDER 
  
DECEMBER 2005 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Sally Wallace 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 The purpose of this study is to assess the incidence of economic growth and social 
attainment in Mozambique during the 1990s.  There is a growing international debate 
about the impact of growth on poverty and inequality.  International development goals 
endorsed by the United Nations, the World Bank, and governments from around the 
world emphasize achieving quantitative targets across various dimensions of welfare 
including, but not limited to, income.  Therefore, efforts at evaluating growth must go 
beyond aggregates and focus on the experience of the poor during the growth process.  
The methodology used here is based on growth incidence curves first developed by 
Ravallion and Chen (2003, 267) for income growth rates and extended to social welfare 
(e.g., education level, vaccination rates) indicators by Klasen (2005).  Growth incidence 
curves show the incidence of growth across the population distribution.  They have the 
vii 
 benefit of describing how the gains from growth are distributed during the growth 
process.  Using data from Mozambique’s 1997 and 2003 household living conditions 
surveys, a growth incidence curve is calculated for Mozambique using consumption as a 
welfare metric.  Data limitations do not allow non-income growth incidence curves to be 
calculated; however, an approach combining quantile distributions and kernel regressions 
using education data is taken in the spirit of the non-income growth incidence curve 
approach.  Consumption growth in Mozambique is demonstrated to have been pro-poor 
by some definitions but not others.  The general conclusion about the growth of 
educational attainment is that it has been pro-poor as well.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 The purpose of this study is to assess the incidence of economic growth and social 
attainment in Mozambique during the 1990s.  Mozambique is a poor, highly-indebted 
country that launched economic reforms in the late 1980s to reverse a long period of 
economic stagnation and decline and enjoyed a subsequent period of high growth 
associated with economic recovery and poverty reduction.  Among the questions this 
study seeks to assess are:  Did growth reach the poor as much as the non-poor?  Did 
economic inequality decline?  How much poverty reduction was the result of economic 
growth as opposed to income redistribution?  Did social indicators improve and how did 
this relate to those who were beneficiaries of growth?   
 The methodology to be used is based on growth incidence curves first developed 
by Ravallion and Chen (2003) for economic growth rates and subsequently applied for 
indicators or proxies of social welfare (e.g., education level, vaccination rates) by Klasen 
(2005).  A growth incidence curve shows the incidence of growth across the population 
distribution.  This has the benefit of describing how the gains from growth were 
distributed during the growth process.  Growth incidence curves for social attainment can 
be constructed to show the pure incidence of the measure across quantiles of the 
population (unconditional incidence curves) or can be conditioned against the distribution 
of growth (conditional incidence curves).  The latter demonstrates graphically whether or 
not social attainment tracked closely the incidence of income growth.  The use of growth 
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incidence curves in these ways is increasingly important in the current debate of “pro-
poor growth” within the international development community. 
 Growth incidence curves can be constructed on the basis of income (or 
consumption) data from national household surveys for two periods in time.  For this 
study, the 1996/7 and 2002/3 nationwide household survey data sets for Mozambique 
known as the Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares (IAF) will be used.   
 The imperative of global poverty reduction is receiving increasing international 
attention.  Of the over 5 billion people on earth in 2001, approximately 1.1 billion eked 
out a living on less than one dollar per day while a staggering 2.7 billion existed on less 
than two dollars a day (World Bank 2004).  But these figures alone cannot do justice to 
the horror of poverty because poverty is much more than a lack of income.  According to 
the poor themselves – 60,000 of them worldwide - surveyed for the 2000/2001 World 
Development Report on poverty (World Bank 2001, 15): 
“To be poor is to be hungry, to lack shelter and clothing, to be sick and not 
cared for, to be illiterate and not schooled. But for poor people, living in 
poverty is more than this. Poor people are particularly vulnerable to 
adverse events outside their control. They are often treated badly by the 
institutions of state and society and excluded from voice and power in 
those institutions.” 
Poverty is clearly a multidimensional phenomenon, and the understanding of this reality 
has finally moved beyond the realm of rhetoric and theory and into the practice of 
governments and international organizations concerned with development.   
That the international community is thinking differently about growth, poverty and 
development can be seen in the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and their current acceptance in the policy and 
evaluation practice of governments and international organizations worldwide.   
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 The MDGs, most for 2015, do not commit the nations of the world to achieving 
growth targets.  They are concerned instead with the results of growth and the 
distribution of opportunities, namely: halving absolute poverty and the number that suffer 
from hunger; achieving universal primary education, ensuring equal access to education 
by girls and boys; reducing child mortality by two-thirds; reducing maternal mortality by 
three-quarters; halting and beginning to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and 
other major diseases; halving the number of people without sustainable access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation, and so on.  Such a more holistic and results-focused 
approach to development requires new ways of assessing economic growth and its impact 
on poverty reduction and opportunity distribution.  
 Following this introduction, Chapter II provides a review of the literature on 
growth, poverty and inequality and its recent extension into the idea of pro-poor growth.  
This is followed by a review of recent economic developments in Mozambique as well as 
trends in inequality and poverty there.  Chapter III covers data and methodology starting 
with a summary of the Mozambican household surveys, the methodology behind the 
calculations of various types of growth incidence curves, as well as a description of the 
various welfare variables selected for analysis.  Chapter IV presents and discusses the 
results of the growth incidence analysis and Chapter V concludes.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Growth, Poverty and Inequality 
There is a rich literature on the nexus of growth, poverty, and inequality.  This 
review will not delve into the literature on economic growth per se, but will instead focus 
on the interrelationship among the three phenomena in theory and practice.  This section 
is broken down into (a) a discussion of the concepts of inequality and poverty, (b) the 
closely related issue of their measurement, and (c) the theoretical relationships between 
growth, inequality, and poverty and how empirical evidence from the literature bears 
them out.  This review will lead into the subsequent topic of “pro-poor growth” which 
recently has emerged in policy circles and the academic literature uniting these issues.  
Concepts of Poverty and Inequality 
Poverty is of both intrinsic and instrumental significance in the study and pursuit 
of development.  In many respects, the systemic elimination of the multiplicity of 
deprivations inherent in poverty – ill health, illiteracy, exposure, insecurity, shame, fear, 
pain, hopelessness – is the very objective of the development process.  On the other hand 
poverty is the biggest barrier to its own eradication and thus is of instrumental, or 
functional, significance. As axiomatic as that sounds, those who live on the margins of 
survival lack the very means – from income, to skills, to physical energy, to social 
support – to overcome their plight.  It is thus important to examine various concepts of 
poverty in the literature in order to appreciate the strengths and weaknesses of various 
attempts at measurement and evaluation. 
4 
5 
Amartya Sen won the Nobel Prize in economics for his contributions to welfare 
analysis and the measurement and assessment of poverty and inequality.  His approach 
reunited political and ethical philosophy with the study of economic development in the 
tradition of earlier economists like Adam Smith.  Sen’s capabilities, or freedoms, 
approach is a significant departure from the income based measures that are standard in 
the economics literature and they motivate this study’s goal of moving beyond income-
based assessment. 
 Sen notes that inequality (and one can include by extension poverty) is ultimately 
the result of social arrangements and the latter is critical to the ultimate evaluation and 
assessment of the former(Sen 1992, ix).  To examine poverty solely through an economic 
lens, such as the absence of sufficient income levels or even in terms of material 
deprivations that manifest in biological form such as malnutrition or hunger, is to be 
distracted from the larger sociological and political institutions that have produced, 
tolerated, and sustained that situation.  However, a framework for assessing well-being 
cannot simply focus on social institutions as this would deny individual agency and 
choice its rightful place in the realization of development outcomes.  The approach must 
recognize both the diversity of individuals and the many ways in which they themselves 
might judge their well-being. 
It is ultimately the “capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to 
value” that should drive our assessment (Sen 1992, 4-5).  “Functionings” are outcomes in 
the sense either of states of being or accomplishments.  They can vary from being 
nourished, avoiding premature death, being a valued member of a community, or having 
self respect.  As is obvious from these examples, functionings are states of being and 
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doing that are of value to individuals.  If the value judgment is ultimately left with the 
individual, then we must focus on what capabilities will enable them to achieve their 
desired beings and doings.  The focus of the capabilities approach is on the freedom to 
achieve and not the achievement itself.  Sen does grant that in assessing situations of 
extreme poverty, the analysis of a small set of basic functionings and their associated 
capabilities would take us a good measure of the distance to assessing well-being in that 
particular context (1992, 44-45).  It is from this point of departure that it is useful to 
consider some of the standard approaches in the economic literature. 
Most concepts of poverty in the economics literature start with some notion of a 
poverty line under which one is determined to be poor and above which non-poor.  At a 
certain level, any such line is arbitrary.  Few would argue that being just above or below 
a poverty line represents a significantly different standard of living, yet one would be 
labeled poor and the other not.  However, poverty lines provide a transparent and 
practical benchmark for assessment.  Poverty lines are calculated on the basis of data 
drawn from household surveys.  These lines have various expressions, as measures of 
income, consumption, nutrition, or even caloric intake as in the case of some Indian 
poverty lines.  At a more fundamental level, they  represent a view of the “minimum level 
of ‘acceptable’ economic participation in a given society at a given point in time” (Ray 
1998).  Poverty lines should be treated with some degree of caution with an 
understanding of the inherent choices made in selecting a particular poverty line for 
consideration.  The following discussion draws from Ray. 
First, most poverty lines measure the capacity to consume and not consumption 
itself.  Just because individuals achieve certain levels of income or consumption levels 
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relative to a poverty line does not mean that they will necessarily consume a basket of 
goods that satisfies a normative minimum standard.  Two individuals with the same 
income levels can choose to spend those resources on very different baskets of goods and 
services with very different nutritive, caloric, or welfare characteristics.  One household 
head might choose to provide square meals for the entire family as opposed to the other 
who spends a large proportion of income on alcohol, tobacco and gambling and spends 
the tiny remaining fraction on the family’s basic needs.  Notwithstanding these 
limitations, income and consumption-based poverty lines are widely used because of the 
accessibility of the information needed to construct them and because they do roughly 
proxy for welfare. 
Another inherent consideration is whether to treat poverty as an absolute or 
relative concept.  At a basic level, where deprivation meets biological imperatives, 
poverty is undeniably absolute.  There are basic levels of caloric and nutritive intake that 
are necessary for human survival.  One could easily extend this from food to non-food 
dimensions such as food and shelter without much argument.  However, at a certain point 
overall socioeconomic standards and norms of what constitutes minimum acceptable 
well-being in a given society take on greater significance in judgments about poverty.  
These needs differ from country to country across rich and poor societies.  This approach 
has led some countries to construct relative poverty lines that are based on a fraction of 
mean national income or consumption. 
Poverty has a temporal dimension and thus can vary from being a temporary 
phenomenon to a chronic state, the latter spanning generations of a family in some 
instances.  In many developing countries with widespread poverty (however measured) 
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people are clustered close to poverty lines and exist above or below it at any given time.  
External shocks (e.g., weather, economic, etc.) can temporarily plunge individuals or 
households into the sample of the poor at a particular point in time.  Others may represent 
a long line of chronically poor. 
Chronic poverty is defined by its extended duration which is intuitively related to 
the idea of living in poverty for the majority of one’s life or to passing on poverty from 
one generation to the next (i.e. intergenerational poverty).  Hulme and Shepherd propose 
a working definition of chronic poverty as occurring “when an individual experiences 
significant capability deprivations for a period of five years or more” (Hulme and 
Shepherd 2003, 405).  The authors admit that the selection of this duration is rather 
arbitrary, but the underlying idea is that it captures a significant portion of an individual’s 
life and reflects empirical evidence (albeit limited) that people who are poor for this long 
have a higher probability of remaining poor for their entire lives (Corcoran, M. 1995 in 
Hulme and Shepherd 2003). Green and Hulme (2005) cite the following updated 
definition from the Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2004): “…people who remain poor 
for much of their life course, who may ‘pass on’ their poverty to their children, and who 
may die of easily preventable deaths because of the poverty they experience.”  
While in all likelihood chronic poverty is positively related to the severity of 
poverty and to the existence of deprivations across multiple dimensions of well-being, 
empirical research still endeavors to establish a clearer understanding of the relationships.  
Hulme and Shepherd propose a five-tier system to categorize poverty in its temporal 
dimensions, consisting of the “always poor,” “usually poor,” “churning poor,” 
‘occasionally poor,” and “never poor” with those in the first two categories considered 
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chronic poor, the second two categories transient poor, while the final category through 
the wealthy are the non-poor.  The “always poor” are those whose poverty measure is 
below the threshold in every period while the “usually poor” find their mean poverty 
score below the poverty line but are not poor in every period. This approach to chronic 
poverty still utilizes expenditure/income/nutrition levels as the basis for defining poverty 
although is flexible to accommodate other factors.    
Finally, the question of the level at which poverty analysis takes place is of 
practical importance to most applied policy analysis.  While we are ultimately concerned 
about the poverty of individuals, for numerous reasons the household has been the 
traditional unit of data collection and analysis.  Information on a poverty measure is 
collected at the household level and then divided by the number of household members.  
This approach encounters three problems.  First is that this method obviously glosses 
over what happens with intra-household distribution of resources which could be, and 
often is, discriminatory with respect certain members (e.g. women, the elderly, etc.).  
Second, poorer households often have a greater number of members generally, and 
children specifically, than more wealthy households.  Simple division of total household 
income or consumption across household size can give a misleading per capita picture as 
the children or the elderly have different needs than working age adults.  There obviously 
are ways of getting around this problem using adult equivalence scales (Ray 1998).  A 
final consideration is that a household has certain fixed costs regardless of size.  Smaller 
households that cannot spread these costs over more members are at a disadvantage. 
With this coverage of poverty, we now turn briefly to the concept of inequality.  
Poverty concerns levels of welfare while inequality concerns its distribution.  Borrowing 
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again from Ray (1998), inequality, like poverty, has both intrinsic and instrumental 
qualities.  There are philosophical arguments in favor of equality, at least in terms of 
prospects and opportunities, if not outcomes.  If inequality impacts growth – or any other 
issue of significance – either one way or another, then inequality has functional 
significance and therefore is worthy of examination.   
Like poverty, income or wealth inequality can be looked at along the dimensions 
of absolute and relative as well as temporary and permanent.  The issue of relative 
inequality will be picked up in the section concerning measurement, so we will briefly 
focus on other conceptual foundations of inequality.  The first is the idea of mobility.  A     
snapshot of inequality at a given point in time says very little without additional 
information.  For one thing, it could either represent a temporary phenomenon which may 
not motivate significant concern or a deeply entrenched problem of major social 
significance.  This leads to another set of considerations:  What is the functional or 
personal distribution of inequality?  These interrelated issues concern the return to factors 
of production (wages, profits, rents) and how those factors are owned by individuals or 
households.  Understanding this space in a given society will say a lot about why 
inequality exists and how it accumulates and is transmitted.  Ray notes that while 
approaches to the measurement of inequality do not capture these concerns, they are still 
important to bear in mind when doing empirical analysis of inequality (Ray 1998, 173).  
Measurement 
This section will cover standard quantitative measures of poverty and inequality 
as a point of departure to their interpretation in later sections in the case of Mozambique 
and to set a backdrop for the introduction to newer approaches that are used later as well.   
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Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984), building on Sen (1976), developed a set of 
three decomposable poverty measures that have together become the workhorses of 
applied poverty analysis.  Conceptually, they measure the incidence of poverty, the depth 
of poverty, and the severity of poverty and are known, respectively, as the headcount 
ratio, the poverty gap ratio, and the squared poverty gap ratio.  They take the following 
basic functional form:   
 
 
 
where n is the population, y is the average income of the household, and z is the poverty 
line. The values of 0, 1, and 2 are used for the parameter α to reflect increasing sensitivity 
to inequality among the poor.   
With the value of α=0, P reduces simply to the headcount ratio. The headcount 
ratio measures the percentage of the population whose income or consumption falls 
below the established poverty line, which represents a minimum threshold that society 
believes is adequate.   
While widely used, the headcount ratio fails two axioms of a good poverty 
measure according to Sen (1976). The first is the monotonicity axiom which states that, 
all else equal, a reduction of income below the poverty line must increase the poverty 
measure.  This does not hold with the headcount ratio because it is not at all sensitive to 
the depth or extent of poverty, simply the number above or below the line.  The second 
axiom which the headcount fails is the transfer axiom, which states that all else equal any 
transfer from a person below the poverty line to anyone who is richer must increase the 
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poverty measure.   In this case, such regressive transfers either leave the headcount the 
same or, perversely, improve it if the transfer moves the recipient from below to above 
the poverty line.  Notwithstanding these inadequacies, the headcount ratio provides a 
brute aggregate measure of poverty and is widely utilized. 
The poverty gap index, represented by α=1, is the average distance that measured 
income or consumption falls below the poverty line, expressed as a proportion of the line.  
The poverty gap index is normalized across the entire population with the non-poor 
treated as having no poverty gap.  A poverty gap of 40% means that the average 
consumption (income) of the poor is 60% of the poverty line.  The poverty gap satisfies 
the monotonicity axiom because if the income shortfall increases, everything else equal, 
the poverty gap measure will worsen.  However, it does not satisfy the transfer axiom 
because it is insensitive to income changes among the poor.  A transfer from the poorest 
person to the next poorest person would not change the poverty gap measure. 
The squared poverty gap index, which is represented when α=2, satisfies both the 
monotonicity and transfer axioms because it takes account of the distribution of income 
among the poor.  As its name implies, it squares each poverty gap thus increasing the 
sensitivity of the measure to large shortfalls from the poverty line.  If a transfer is made 
from someone just below the poverty line to another far below the line, the squared 
poverty gap index would decrease reflecting lower inequality among the poor.  In this 
situation, the headcount index would not change and nor would the poverty gap since the 
overall average shortfall of the poor remains the same but is distributed differently. 
As noted, the preceding poverty measures are limited by the fact that they are tied 
to measures of income in relation to a poverty line.  They do not address any of the other 
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dimensions of well-being that may be important, particularly from a capabilities 
perspective such as health, education, or access to clean water and safe shelter, etc.  
There have been other attempts to move beyond these and other standard measures of 
well-being such as GDP per capita.  The most notable of these is the United Nations 
Development Program’s Human Development Index (HDI) and its related family of 
indices, including the Human Poverty Index (HPI) (UNDP 1997).   
The HDI is a composite measure consisting of average achievement of a country 
in three basic dimensions of human development (longevity, knowledge, and standard of 
living).  The HDI contains three variables: life expectancy, educational attainment (adult 
literacy and combined primary and secondary school enrollment) and real GDP per capita 
(in PPP$).  While the HDI measures attainment, the HPI measures deprivation along the 
same dimensions that make up the HDI.  While debate is engaged over the selection of 
variables that make up the HDI, their relative weighting within the index, and the 
theoretical underpinnings of the HDI family, the Human Development Index is a widely 
recognized and made a notable contribution to moving beyond income in aggregate 
measures of welfare and poverty. 
Moving to the issue of inequality, the standard approach to measuring the relative 
inequality of a distribution – be it income, wealth, assets, etc. – has been built around four 
basic ethical principles: the anonymity principle, the population principle, the relative 
income principle, and the Dalton principle.  The anonymity principle states that the actual 
identity of individuals or households ranked in a distribution is immaterial to the 
inequality measure.  In other words, it does not matter to an impartial measure of 
inequality if, all things being equal, you are ranked first and I am ranked last or the other 
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way around. The population principle allows two groups with the exact same relative 
distributions to be considered equivalent from an inequality perspective even if one 
contains twice as many people as the other.  The relative income principle asserts that it 
is the relative shares of income that should matter to inequality measurement and not the 
absolute amounts.1  Finally, the Dalton principle says that if one distribution can be 
created from another by a series of regressive transfers within the latter then the former 
distribution is the more unequal of the two starting distributions.   
Thankfully, these principles deliver the more intuitively understandable concept 
of the Lorenz curve, which is one of the most popular ways of depicting inequality.  The 
Lorenz curve plots cumulative shares of population on the x axis and cumulative shares 
of income on the y axis.   A 45° line emanating from the origin depicts complete equality 
and thus any deviation from this is a bowed loop below and to the right of the line of 
equality.  The further from the 45° line, the greater the inequality.  Separate distributions 
can be calculated and depicted this way for comparison.  
                                                 
1 While this is a widely accepted principle in the literature, its acceptance in popular discourse is contested.   
Ravallion (2003) notes how the global debate on whether inequality and poverty have increased or 
decreased over the last quarter of a century is driven by the value placed by some on absolute levels of 
inequality. 
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FIGURE 1 
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If one distribution is everywhere to the left of another – thus never crossing – then 
it can be said to be a more equal distribution.  If Lorenz curves cross, the Dalton principle 
has been violated and it cannot be concluded whether one distribution is more or less 
equal than the other because to do so would require weighting of the value of certain 
transfers among the population in a subjective and therefore contestable manner.  
The Lorenz curve leads to a popular quantitative measure of inequality: the Gini 
Coefficient.  The Gini coefficient measures all pairwise combinations of income in a 
population.  The coefficient falls between zero and one with zero representing total 
equality where the entire population has equal shares to complete inequality where one 
individual has all income.  As shown on the Lorenz curve diagram above, the Gini 
measures the ratio of the shaded area between the curve and the equality line (A) to the 
total area under the equality line (A+B), a value of one. 
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Theory and Empirical Evidence 
 Growth and Inequality 
Theories on the relationship between growth and inequality have a long history in 
 fit broadly into two categories.  One set focuses on 
e imp n the distribution of income while the other sees the 
causal relationship running from the distribution of income to economic growth.  This 
section will briefly summarize the state of the literature drawing on Lopez (2004). 
ple 
observation that income was more unequally distributed in poor countries than rich ones 
and that development appeared to be a process that was uneven, benefiting some and 
leaving others behind to catch up later.  In this way, the evolution of inequality over time 
would appear as an “inverted U.”  As per capita income grew, the theory went, inequality 
would increase as those best positioned and endowed to take advantage of the growth 
process benefited (usually in the industrial or “modern” sectors of the economy) while 
the rest (usually in rural and agriculture sectors) were left behind.  As the industrial sector 
expanded, resources in the economy would be reallocated and there would be migration 
out of the stagnating rural domain.  Through this process the benefits of growth would 
permeate the economy and the incomes of those originally left behind would catch up and 
inequality would fall. 
 may lead to higher productivity given its differential impact on the 
productivity of labor of different types.  On the one hand, new technologies could drive 
the economics literature and can be
th act of economic growth o
Perhaps the most well-known theory of inequality and development is the 
Kuznets hypothesis.  This was a broad development theory that grew out of the sim
Lopez notes that more recent models argue that economic growth driven by 
technological progress
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up the  this 
 Dollar 
002, ; Ravallion and Chen 1997) although early studies claiming to establish 
the Ku
lesina 
and Ro
ibutive 
licies are bad for growth because they negatively affect capital 
accumu
Finally, 
at in a 
 economic growth, 
premium for skilled labor and thus increase inequality while on the other hand
could expand the pool of skilled labor leading to an overall ambiguous effect on 
inequality. 
The existence of the “Inverted U” relationship is not borne out by most of the 
recent empirical studies (Anand and Kanbur 1993, ; Deininger and Squire 1998, ;
and Kraay 2
znets hypothesis held early sway in the debate, notably Ahluwalia (1976). 
Turning now to the inequality-to-growth relationship, theories can be divided into 
those which posit that inequality hinders growth and those which suggest the opposite.  
That inequality hinders growth is based on three arguments:  political economy (A
drik 1994), sociopolitical instability (Alesina and Perotti 1996), and credit 
constraints.    
The political economy argument rests on three pillars that when taken together 
would suggest that as inequality falls growth will increase.  The first is that redistr
government po
lation.  The second is that an individual’s preferred level of taxation and 
expenditure is inversely related to his income because the benefits of expenditure are 
equally distributed among individuals while taxes are proportional to income.  
government chooses a tax rate based on the median voter’s preference meaning th
more unequal society the tendency for redistribution will be stronger. 
The sociopolitical instability theory is straightforward.  Income inequality fuels 
social and political discontent.  This is highly prejudicial for investment which requires 
stability and minimal future uncertainty.  Since investment is critical to
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higher g 
uman capital.  Credit constraints exist 
which c
th. 
at of 
growth
lpful 
 of 
 
ntry regressions to test 
the pol pact 
h 
inequality transmits to lower growth through sociopolitical instability’s depressin
effect on investment and thereby hinder growth. 
The third and final argument on inequality’s hindrance of growth is based on the 
efficient functioning of credit markets.  Galor and Zeira (1993) note that development 
requires complementarity between physical and h
an prevent the poor from having the resources to invest in education.  Thus 
inequality will suppress the level of human capital investment and thereby hinder grow
Turning to the models that predict that inequality will enhance growth, there are 
three.  One assumes that the marginal propensity of the rich to save is greater than th
the poor.  If one accepts that higher saving stimulates investment which stimulates 
 then higher inequality will be conducive of growth.  Another proposition is 
advanced using the notion of investment indivisibilities.  If large initial investments are 
required for growth-promoting capital projects then wealth concentration will be he
in the face of credit constraints resulting from imperfect markets.  A final prediction
inequality-enhanced growth comes from the idea that higher inequality provides a better
incentive to work because wages are less compressed and thus reward merit as opposed 
to more equal situations where the opposite conditions prevail. 
While the empirical literature on the growth-to-inequality relationship was 
unanimous, the same cannot be said for the inequality-to-growth theories.  Both Alesina 
and Rodrik (1994) and Alesina and Perotti (1996) run cross-cou
itical economy and sociopolitical instability models that predict a negative im
of inequality on growth.  In both studies, their results confirm the model’s prediction.  
However, Li and Zou (1998) build a model based on a more general framework in whic
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all government spending is not considered productive expenditure, as is implicit in 
Alesina and Rodrik.  This approach yields results that find that income inequality is 
positively and often significantly related to economic growth.  Forbes (2000) argues that 
a panel framework using fixed effects estimates is more appropriate than the cross-
country models using OLS techniques of Alesina and Rodrik and Alesina and Perotti
given that they will be biased by omitted country-specific effects.  Her results, like Li and
Zou, conclude that income inequality is positively associated with economic growth
Finally, Barro (2000) finds no relationship between inequality and growth using panel
data and a three-stage least squares estimator that treats country specific effects as 
random errors. 
Finally, Deininger and Squire’s work (1998) looks at asset (land) inequality and
growth for a different perspective.  In comparison to initial income inequality that d
not seem to hav
 
 
.  
 
 
oes 
e an impact on growth, initial inequality in the distribution of land is 
negativ
1. There is a degree of consensus that growth does not have a causal effect on 
income inequality, either positive or negative. 
 leads to faster 
The  into the growth and inequality 
equ
ely associated with subsequent growth. 
The following can be summarized from the foregoing review: 
2. In the other direction, some studies conclude that inequality
growth while others that inequality slows growth. 
 following section will bring poverty reduction
ation.  
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Growth, Inequality, and Poverty Reduction  
Dollar and Kraay (2002), in a cross-country empirical study of both developed 
and developing countries, find that average incomes (GDP per capita) of the poorest 
quin c e, concluding that growth is good 
for the poor.  Their findings are consistent across regions, income levels, and in periods 
of normalcy and crisis.  They suggest their evidence does not support the idea that growth 
“trickles down” or that countries go through a Kuznets type transition from low to high to 
low inequality, but that the poor share contemporaneously in the growth process on 
average.  They further point out that these results do not suggest that growth is all that is 
necessary for the poor or that distributional impacts should be ignored, they simply stress 
that the results suggest that growth on average benefits the poor as much as everyone 
else.  
s 
erty reducing growth using panel data of a cross-section of countries.  He 
concludes that roughly half of the variation in short-term changes in poverty can be 
explained by growth in average incomes. Between 66 and 90 percent of the variation in 
changes in poverty over the medium- to long-term can be explained by growth in average 
incomes. Virtually all of the remainder is due to changes in relative incomes. In contrast, 
cross-country differences in the sensitivity of poverty to growth in average incomes 
account for very little of the variation in changes in poverty.  He also finds that the 
impact of growth on poverty reduction lessens as one moves from the headcount to the 
squared poverty gap index suggesting that as inequality among the poor increases the 
impact of growth diminishes. 
tile rise or fall proportionately with average in om
Using standard decomposition techniques, Kraay (2004) examines three source
of pov
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Ravallion (2001) examines 120 “spells” of growth, mostly in the 1990s, based 
the World Bank’s dataset of ho
on 
usehold surveys for about 50 developing countries.  Each 
spell is  
ss 
efined 
te the growth elasticity of 
poverty
 
he 
 
2 by 
nt 
                                                
 defined by the interval between two surveys.  This data shows that on average, the
poor benefit from aggregate growth and are hurt in aggregate contractions.  Income 
inequality is not correlated with average household income growth per capita.  However, 
the heterogeneity of experiences of the poor is masked by the averaging process acro
countries with very different levels of growth, poverty, and inequality.  Thus, more 
micro-oriented studies are needed to get at the diversity of experiences below the 
averages and to say something useful for policymakers. 
Using the same World Bank database, Adams (2004) uses an updated and r
set of 126 intervals for 60 developing countries to calcula
, which measures the percentage change in poverty given a corresponding 
percentage increase in economic growth.  He finds that while economic growth does
reduce poverty (based on the PPP$1/person/day measure), the degree depends on t
measure of economic growth used.  Controlling for changes in income inequality, the 
growth elasticity of headcount poverty is -2.79 when economic growth is measured by
changes in survey mean income (consumption).   However, when growth is measured 
changes in GDP per capita, the growth elasticity of poverty is much less than other rece
studies suggest at a statistically insignificant -2.27.  Growth elasticities using the poverty 
gap and squared poverty gap measures are even higher than those based on the 
headcount.  Thus, growth even reduces the depth and intensity of poverty.  According to 
 
2 The author performed his calculations with and without Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EE/CA) data to 
isolate the impact of the growth collapse resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union.  Statistics 
presented here are for all countries in the sample excluding EE/CA.   
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the econometric analysis in this study, growth does not impact inequality, which
very little over time (0.83 percent increase per year).   
These findings are based on averages calculated across a diverse set of countries, 
which masks important variation between countries, so
 changes 
 Adams divides the sample in two 
to test 
 
nce 
 as a function of different levels of inequality and 
develo
 
Pro-Poor Growth
results according to initial inequality levels.  The growth elasticity of headcount 
poverty (survey mean) for “low” inequality countries (Gini<.4) is -5.866 compared to -
2.461 for “high” inequality countries (Gini>.4).  The same calculations using GDP per 
capita were -2.282 and -1.2, respectively.   In other words, initial inequality levels do 
matter for the poverty reducing impact of growth.  Lopez (2004) cites Ravallion (2004)
drawing a similar conclusion from his work with growth elasticities of poverty and 
concluding that “growth will be quite a blunt instrument against poverty unless that 
growth comes with falling inequality.” 
Lopez (2004) cites Lopez and Serven (2004) which looks at the share of varia
in the changes in poverty due to growth
pment.  From this approach, he concludes that in high-inequality countries a 
growth promotion strategy alone will have less impact on poverty reduction whereas in 
high-poverty countries, an emphasis on high growth is appropriate even if it means a
slight deterioration in inequality.  These observations will be relevant for the 
Mozambique case which we will examine later. 
A recent survey of the pro-poor growth li
 
terature (Lopez 2004) summarized 
alternative definitions of pro-poor growth and the following several points of consensus 
that have emerged from the literature on growth, inequality, poverty, and policy:  (a) 
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growth is fundamental for poverty r nciple growth as such does not 
seem to ge is 
ems 
 
Klasen (2005) provides the clearest summary of the various notions of pro-poor 
growth that have been offered in the literature (Kakwani and Pernia 2000, ; Ravallion and 
Chen 2003, ; White and Anderson 2000) by reducing them to three basic interpretations 
along two dimensions: absolute and relative.  For those who subscribe to a relative 
concep
 some 
 
eduction, and in pri
 affect inequality; (b) growth accompanied by progressive distributional chan
better than growth alone; (c) high initial inequality is a brake on poverty reduction; (d) 
poverty itself is also likely to be a barrier for poverty reduction; (e) asset inequality se
to predict lower future growth rates; (f) education, infrastructure and macroeconomic 
stability seem to positively affect both growth and the distribution of income.  There 
seems to be little agreement beyond this, in particular on the potential impact on growth
of income inequality and redistribution and the potential impact of various policies (trade, 
financial sector liberalization, fiscal adjustment, among others) have on inequality in 
general. 
t of pro-poor growth, growth is “pro-poor” when it results in higher growth rates 
for the poor than the non-poor.  In other words, growth must be biased toward the poor 
regardless of its impact on the reduction of poverty levels (as measured by a headcount 
index).  While perhaps intuitively appealing, this definition is clearly problematic in
respects.  Assume two countries with the same starting levels of poverty. Country A 
achieves average growth of 6%, with rates of 4% for the poor and 2% for the non poor 
while Country B achieves 10% average growth with 4% among the poor and 6% among
the non-poor.  The first would be judged “pro-poor” while the second would have done 
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more both to reduce poverty and increase growth for all, but would not be deemed “pro-
poor” because incomes of the rich grew more than those of the poor. 
The absolute pro-poor growth camp has two interpretations.  The first is the idea 
of “strong” absolute pro-poor growth in which the absolute amount of the income gain of 
the poo
 
 poor 
 is greater than zero.  This is 
the stan
 satisfy 
ffs between growth and distribution on 
poverty
r 
e 
r exceeds that of the non-poor.  White and Anderson (2000) show how difficult 
this is to achieve in practice.  For this to happen the growth rate of the poor “would have 
to be larger by a factor calculated as the initial income ratio of the non-poor to the poor”
(Klasen 2005).  In the White and Anderson analysis of the growth episodes of 143 
countries during intervals for which comparable national income surveys for two points 
in time are available, only 5 experience pro-poor growth by this definition when the
are defined as the bottom 20% of the income distribution. 
The second notion of absolute pro-poor growth is known as “weak” and is defined 
as the case when the growth rate in income among the poor
dard used by Ravallion and Chen (2003).  Like relative pro-poor growth, 
however, it is easy to imagine an example of a country with 1% growth for the poor and 
10% growth for the non-poor, which would strictly fit this definition but wouldn’t
most notions of a progressive growth pattern.   
Inherent in determining which of these definitions of pro-poor growth is the most 
appropriate requires consideration of the trade-o
 reduction.  Unfortunately, as Klasen summarizes: “little is known about such 
trade-offs” (in the short or long-term, in different countries, associated with different 
policies) and this should be the focus of policy research.  He goes on to suggest that fo
operational purposes there is no need to choose between the relative and weak absolut
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definition, as they address two different and important questions.  The first addresses 
whether there has been a bias in growth toward the poor while the latter focuses on how 
much income of the poor has grown, regardless of what happened to the non-poor, bot
of which are relevant questions for policymakers and the starting point for examination o
deeper determinants of the change described. 
h 
f 
Growth, Poverty and Inequality in Mozambique 
Context and Recent Economic Developments 
There are few countries which have experienced as tumultuous a recent history as 
isbon brought to power a government 
ready t
d with 
as 
 
 
ambique achieved some of the highest growth rates on the 
contine
ry 
Mozambique.  In April 1974, a military coup in L
o sue for peace with Mozambique’s armed liberation movement, the Front for the 
Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).  Within months a deal was reached with 
FRELIMO and suddenly over four hundred and fifty years of Portuguese occupation and 
colonialism were over.  Late to independence relative to the rest of the continent an
minimal human capital due to the exclusion and oppression Mozambique’s native 
population suffered at the hands of the Portuguese settlers, few could have imagined that 
things could get more difficult.  However, shortly after independence the country w
plunged into a regional and civil conflict.  Peace was not restored until 17 years later, but 
not after the war took the lives of a million people and destroyed much of the economic
and social infrastructure.   
Unlike many war to peace transitions in Africa, Mozambique’s post-war recovery
has been phenomenal.  Moz
nt, averaging 8.1% annually from 1993 to 2004 (AfDB/OECD 2004).  This strong 
economic record was fueled by high levels of foreign aid, favorable weather, and the ve
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low base upon which recovery started following the war (Arndt, Jensen et al. 2000).  
Nominal per capita income increased from $139 in 1990 to and estimated $220 in 2001.  
Gross investment was 30% of GDP from 1995 to 2001, compared to the Sub-Saharan 
African average of 18% (UNECA 2003).  Generous aid and debt relief helped the country
to invest 63% of non-interest expenditures in the priority sectors of education, health, 
agriculture, infrastructure, good governance, and macroeconomic and financial 
management (Republic of Mozambique 2005, 103). 
Despite this recent progress, over 50% of the population still lives in abs
poverty.  Income and wealth inequalities remain perv
 
olute 
asive and there are serious concerns 
over th he 
lt 
 
 realize 
Poverty and Inequality in Mozambique 
s National Institute of Statistics carried out nationally-representative 
surveys of household living conditions in 1996-97 and 2002-03 (known by their 
Portuguese acronym IAF).  The surveys provide a comprehensive picture of absolute 
e sustainability of economic growth given severe human resource deficits and t
growing impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic (AfDB/OECD 2004).  Much of the recent 
growth stems from a few large foreign ventures concentrated in the southern part of the 
country which have minimal spillover effects and have done little for job creation.  Adu
literacy was 44% in 2000, well below the Sub-Saharan African average of 61.5%, with 
severe disparities between male literacy (60%) and female literacy (28%).  Life 
expectancy has fallen from 47.1 years in 1997 to 37.9 years in 2004 while the HIV/AIDS
rate has increased rapidly (UNECA 2003).  Mozambique faces an uphill battle to
a second decade of post-war growth and translate that into meaningful human 
development gains.  
Mozambique’
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poverty as well as detailed information on other dimensions of welfare.  The IAFs use 
consist
y lines 
According to the IAF 1996-97, the national poverty headcount stood at 69.4 
percent, meaning that consumption per capita of over two-thirds of the population was 
not enough to meet basic needs.  Real mean per capita monthly consumption was 160,780 
Meticals, which was equivalent to $170 annually at prevailing exchange rates at the time.  
Using j te 
 
.   
The 2002-03 IAF showed that absolute poverty at the national level declined 
significantly, by 15 percentage points, to 54.1 percent.  The gap between the rural and 
urban poverty levels declined owing to strong recovery and growth in rural areas.  The 
rural headcount was 55.3 per cent compared to 51.5 percent for urban areas.  The central 
zone of ge 
                                                
ent methodologies for data collection, measuring household consumption of food 
(including own production) and non-food items, and constructing national povert
over the two periods.3  The 2002-03 IAF constructed both flexible and fixed bundle 
poverty lines to account for substitution effects due to the changes in relative prices of 
commodities which took place over spatial and temporal domains.4     
ust the food poverty line, 53.4 percent of the national population had inadequa
per capita consumption.  Poverty was higher in rural areas at 71.2 percent than in urban
areas where the headcount was 62 percent.  Regionally, poverty rates were higher in the 
central zone than in the north or south although when Maputo City is excluded from the 
south its poverty levels become comparable to the central zone (MPF/UEM/IFPRI 1998)
 the country, poorest in the 1996-97 IAF, experienced a stunning 28.3 percenta
 
3 Chapter III contains a full summary of the concepts, data and methodology behind the welfare 
calculations of the IAFs. 
4 See MPF/IFPRI/PU (2004) for a detailed explanation of the approach used to calculate the fixed and 
flexible food bundles that underpin the poverty lines in the 2002-03 IAF. 
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point drop in the head count rate while the south actually saw an increase of .7 percent 
and the north a drop of 11 percent (MPF/IFPRI/PU 2004).5   
Measures of the depth of poverty such as the poverty gap index and the squared 
poverty gap index further bear out the positive trends.  The poverty gap index reflects th
intensity of poverty or, in other words, how poor the poor are
e 
. It measures the average 
gap bet
ex 
 
 
or. 
change evel 
                                                
ween measured consumption levels and the poverty line for each poor person.  
The poverty gap index in 2003 was 20.5 percent, down 8.8 percentage points or 30 
percent from the 1996-97 survey level.  By comparison, the PPP$1/day poverty gap ind
for Africa as a whole in 2001 was 20 percent (Chen and Ravallion 2004).  The squared
poverty gap index is more sensitive to the severity of poverty among the poor.  This
measure decreased 5.3 percentage points at the national level between the two IAFs, or 
34 percent.  At the national level the severity of poverty decreased at a slightly higher 
rate than the depth of poverty which is consistent with lower inequality among the po
James, Arndt et al (forthcoming) conducted a comprehensive assessment of 
inequality in Mozambique based on the 2002-03 IAF.  They examined both its level, 
according to the GINI coefficient and the General Entropy (GE) series of measures, and 
 over time since 1996-97.  Overall inequality of consumption at the national l
increased slightly between the two surveys from at GINI of .40 to .42.  However, this 
difference was not statistically significant.  These levels are relatively high, but are low 
 
5 MPF/IFPRI/PU (2004, 28-33) explain the significant decline in poverty rates in the central zone is due to 
the idiosyncratically low level of consumption measured in Sofala province in 1996-97.  This is explained 
by the effect of recent floods at the time of the survey and the concentration of interviews during the 
“hungry season”, and the fact that Sofala had sustained major damage during the war and it is possible that 
living standards were still depressed.  
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compared to many of  Mozambique’s neighbors.6  Rural areas are more equal than urb
areas, but the difference is less pronounced than in 1996 due to the faster decline in rural
poverty over the period.  Inequality is more pronounced in the southern region with a 
Gini of .42 compared to the center and the north, which have Ginis of .35 and .39, 
respectively.  Inequality in Maputo was the highest of any region of the country at .52.
The GE measures can be calibrated to increased sensitivity to inequality am
the poor (GE(1)) or inequality among the rich (GE(2)). Another advantage of the GI 
an 
 
   
ong 
measur
 et 
y 
 
                                                
es compared to the GINI is that they allow for the additive decomposition of the 
measure to within-group and between-group components of inequality (James, Arndt
al. forthcoming, 7).  Using these measures, they note that the high GE(2) measure for 
Maputo City is driven by the small number of relatively very rich households in the 
sample.  The GE(1) measure finds that only 5.4 percent of inequality is explained by 
differences in consumption between the provinces while the remainder is explained b
within-province factors, demonstrating that inequality in the sample is not explained 
principally by differences in mean consumption between the provinces.  Decomposing 
inequality based on household characteristics (rural/urban, sex of household head, 
literacy of household head, and whether or not agriculture is the household’s principal 
employer) finds again that most inequality is explained by within-group factors (90
percent) rather than between these groups (10 percent).  The exception is the case of 
households where agriculture is the principal employer, which the authors find 
 
6 GINI coefficients for other southern African countries are Malawi .503 (1997), Zambia .526 (1998), 
Zimbabwe .568 (1995), Swaziland .609 (1994), Madagascar .475 (2001), Namibia .707 (1993), Botswana 
.630 (1993), South Africa .593 (1995), and Tanzania .382 (1993) are from UNDP (United Nations 
Development Program). 2004. Human development report 2004: Cultural liberty in today's diverse world. 
New York: UNDP. 
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significant.  It means there is more inequality between agriculture and non-agric
households than between rural and urban (James, Arndt et al. forthcoming, 15). 
The authors conclude that growth in Mozambique has been pro-poor as e
ulture 
videnced 
by (a) t
 
 and 
  
or in the social 
dimens
e to 
g 
s the 
res 
he significant drop in the poverty headcount nationally and in most regions, (b) 
growth in per capita consumption across all income groups, (c) a slight (and statistically
insignificant) increase in inequality, and (d) the fact that, notably, inequality across 
regions and provinces has diminished contrary to many popular claims although high
growing inequality in Maputo City is cause for concern (James, Arndt et al. forthcoming, 
16-17).  James, Arndt et al also calculate a growth incidence curve for Mozambique and 
interpret growth as having been pro-poor using the Ravallion and Chen (2003) definition.
The generation and interpretation of a growth incidence curve is one of the objectives of 
this study, so this will be examined in more detail in subsequent sections with reference 
to the interpretation given in James, Arndt et al.   
Since we will later examine whether growth has been pro-po
ion, the study by Heltberg, Simler, et al (2001) provides some potentially 
interesting clues.  They examined the incidence of public spending in Mozambiqu
determine whether it was progressive relative to the distribution of consumption.  Usin
standard non-behavioral benefit incidence analysis, they found that the incidence of 
spending in basic health and education was fairly progressive in most areas.  This wa
case with lower primary education (EP1) and upper primary education (EP2).  As one 
moved to basic post-primary (general and technical) the pattern became less equal.  
Upper secondary education was particularly unequally distributed.  Health expenditu
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on both hospitals and basic health facilities were found to be progressive (Heltberg, 
Simler et al. 2001, 19-21). 
Their analysis did discern a degree of inequality in the distribution of public 
spending by region.  A reasonably large proportion of rural communities in Mozambique 
received new social infrastructure investment (schools, health facilities, roads) since the 
end of the war, but the southern region of the country appeared to consistently get a 
larger share when compared to the central and northern regions.  Similar patterns were 
evident in the distribution of recurrent spending on social services.  Since this analysis 
was based on data from the 1996-97 household survey, we will revisit the extent to which 
the expected results of such patterns are borne out in the 2002-03 survey.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This research study will consist of analysis using quantitative methods to examine 
the incidence of consumption growth and social attainment in Mozambique between 
1996/7 and 2002/3 in order to say more about the strong economic growth experienced 
during this period and whether it meets the standards of pro-poor definitions presented in 
the literature.  The study will calculate a growth incidence curves for consumption based 
on the methodology of Ravallion and Chen (2003).  While Klasen (2005) has adapted the 
growth incidence curve to the non-income dimensions of welfare, data limitations prevent 
us from calculating a series of non-income growth incidence curves for Mozambique 
based on this survey data.  Therefore, this study will examine the incidence of social 
attainment between survey periods in a manner inspired by Klasen’s approach.  This 
research will seek to add to the understanding of what constitutes pro-poor growth 
according to definitions posed in the literature and contribute to the normative question of 
how pro-poor growth should be defined given the important weight being placed on this 
concept as a measure of progress in fighting global poverty. 
32 
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Data7 
This study utilizes household data gathered through Mozambique’s national living 
conditions survey, known as the Inquérito aos Agregados Familiares (IAF), for 1996/7 
and 2002/3.  The two surveys were carried out by Mozambique’s National Institute of 
Statistics and utilize the basic methodology for calculating consumption so that 
comparability of results over time is possible.  Both survey samples are nationally 
representative, although drawn from different sampling frames,8 and are representative 
across rural and urban zones and the country’s ten provinces plus Maputo City.   
The 1996/7 and 2002/3 IAFs contain detailed information on a random sample of 
8,274 and 8,700 households, respectively.  At the household level, two questionnaire 
instruments were used in the 1996/7 survey and three in the 2002/3 survey to collect 
household and personal information.  Each household was interviewed at least three 
times over a seven day period.  In addition, both IAFs included a community level 
questionnaire on available infrastructure in rural areas and of market prices for each 
urban block and rural locality for use in calculating consumption and poverty lines.   
Among the household-level instruments, the principal questionnaire of both 
surveys covered demographic characteristics, health, education, and the employment 
status of individual household members.  The 1996/7 questionnaire included a section on 
                                                 
7 This section draws from “Understanding Poverty and Well-Being in Mozambique:  The First National 
Assessment (1996-97)” (1998) by the Ministry of Planning and Finance, Eduardo Mondlane University, 
and the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and “Poverty and Well-Being in Mozambique:  
The Second National Assessment” (2004) by the National Directorate of Planning and Budget and the 
Economic Research Bureau of the Ministry of Planning and Budget, IFPRI, and Purdue University.   
8 The 2002/3 IAF sample is drawn from the 1997 national census, while the 1996/7 IAF sample is not.  
MPF/IFPRI/Purdue (2004) state that the census is a more reliable sampling frame than the non-census 
frame that was created and used for the 1996/7 IAF.  Although this could pose issues of data comparability, 
and indeed there was a difference in defined rural population in 1996/7 of 80% compared to 70% in 2002/3 
as a result, the authors ran their entire analysis using each survey’s definition of rural and urban and got 
results that differed only slightly and were qualitatively similar (MPF/IFPRI/Purdue 2004, 2). 
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migration given the recent end of civil conflict only a few years earlier.  The 2002/3 
questionnaire included sections on poverty indicators and victimization that were not part 
of the 1996/7 questionnaire.   
In terms of questions concerning the household as a whole, the 1996/7 
questionnaire included questions on land, livestock and tree holdings; agricultural 
production (previous year); dwelling characteristics; basic services used; durable goods 
asset ownership; major nonfood expenditures (last three months), regular monthly 
nonfood expenditures, transfers into and out of the household, and sources of income for 
the household.  The 2002/3 IAF was not as extensive in its collection of this information 
and was limited to dwelling characteristics, durable goods assets, monthly nonfood 
expenditures, transfers and income.  
Finally, the daily expenditures questionnaire for households and individuals of 
both surveys collected information on food and nonfood expenditures consumed during 
the previous seven day period based on the respondent’s recall.   
The questionnaires collected data on consumption and other indicators in a 
manner that permitted comparison over the two periods.  However, the 1996/7 IAF 
included a number of questions on well-being, particularly in the health and education 
modules, that were not included in the 2002/3 IAF.  In addition, the question or response 
structure for certain topics differs between the two surveys.  This limits this study from 
constructing non-income growth incidence curves in a number of potentially interesting 
areas such as nutrition and vaccination rates.  More is said on this matter later in this 
section. 
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Growth Incidence Curves and Alternative Methods 
The primary tool for analyzing pro-poor growth in this study is the Growth 
Incidence Curve (GIC) (Ravallion and Chen 2003).  Klasen (2005) was the first to apply 
Ravallion and Chen’s GIC methodology to social welfare indicators, which he called 
Non-Income Growth Incidence Curves (NIGICs).  In general, these approaches permit 
the graphical depiction of the rate of growth of a chosen welfare indicator across the 
sample population arrayed from the poorest to richest percentile.  The benefit of such a 
method for pro-poor growth analysis is clear.  It facilitates looking beyond averages at 
what happened to the poor, the middle class, and the non-poor during the growth process.  
It is also a useful graphical indicator, which is intuitively appealing.  Finally, it enables 
assessment of whether growth was pro-poor according to both the relative and absolute 
definitions discussed earlier. 
We examine the incidence of growth and/or advancement across two welfare 
indicators:  consumption and education level.  A GIC is created using comparable 
household consumption survey data taken from two points in time.  The GIC for 
household consumption is calculated using a STATA command developed by Lokshin 
and Ravallion (2004) for this purpose.  First, variables are created for nominal and real 
household consumption in 2002/3 and 1996/7.  Specifically, in order to address 
comparability over time, nominal consumption as a percentage of the relevant poverty 
line is the measure used.  The samples are then ordered by per capita consumption and 
grouped into percentiles.  The growth in consumption is calculated at each percentile and 
then graphed with percentile as the x axis and the growth rate of per capita consumption 
as the y axis.   
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NIGICs are calculated using basically the same process, as described in Klasen 
(2005).  However, for each social welfare indicator, an unconditional and conditional 
curve is created.  An unconditional NIGIC orders percentiles from welfare poor (e.g., 
years of school) to welfare rich.  This permits the examination of the incidence of growth 
of social attainment between periods for, say, those who began education poor.  A 
conditional NIGIC combined the social indicator with income data in order to examine 
whether the distribution of progress in social development mirrors that for consumption 
growth.  Unfortunately, while data limitations conspire against producing NIGICs from 
these data, this study will use other techniques based on kernel regression to depict the 
incidence of social attainment across consumption levels in the spirit of Klasen’s 
approach.  This approach is described in greater detail in the results section. 
GICs and NIGICs can be interpreted according to the previous discussion of pro 
poor growth in its absolute (strong or weak) and relative dimensions.  First if the curve is 
in general downward sloping then one can say that growth has been pro-poor in the 
relative sense.  In other words, growth rates for the poor were greater than for the non-
poor and thus inequality fell.  Obviously, the shape of the GIC won’t always be so easily 
interpretable and little may be decisively discerned by its shape.  Second, if the curve is 
upward sloping, but everywhere positive (above zero), then growth can be said to have 
been pro-poor in the absolute (weak) sense.  If one were to measure absolute gains (rather 
than growth rates) on the y axis, then one could calculate whether growth has been pro-
poor in the absolute (strong) sense, i.e. total income going to the poor exceeded that for 
the rich. 
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Selected Welfare Indicators 
Per Capita Consumption 
The first objective is to construct a growth incidence curve for the chosen 
measure of income poverty.  The primary objective of the IAF was to measure the 
welfare of the Mozambican population.  Given the high levels of poverty and deprivation, 
considerable attention is given to the concept of absolute poverty, defined generally as 
“…a measure of the inability of a population to attain a minimum level of well-being” 
(MPF/UEM/IFPRI 1998).  More specifically, the IAFs used per capita consumption (total 
household consumption divided by the number of household members) as the basic 
measure of individual welfare, which also will be the basis for the growth incidence 
curve. 
As noted, the two IAFs use consistent approaches to creating a comprehensive 
measure of consumption, drawing from several modules of the IAF based on the cost of 
basic needs approach (Ravallion 1998).  It measures “…the total value of consumption of 
food and nonfood items (including purchases, home-produced items, and gifts received), 
as well as imputed use values for owner-occupied housing and household durable goods” 
(MPF/IFPRI/PU 2004). 
Using a consumption based measure of poverty raises several conceptual and 
practical issues.  The first concerns the justification of using consumption over income as 
a welfare measure.  Here the authors of the IAF assessments offer four principal reasons: 
(1) welfare achievement is ultimately of interest and this is better approximated by 
consumption as opposed to income which is really welfare opportunity; 
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(2) consumption fluctuates less than income and thus is a more stable measure of 
welfare over time; 
(3) some researchers believe survey respondents are more likely to reveal 
consumption behavior than income; 
(4) it is particularly difficult to measure income for the labor force in developing 
countries given that so many are engaged in self employment.  
The second issue concerns using the household as the unit of aggregation.  Doing 
so masks issues surrounding the intra-household allocation of resources which should not 
be assumed to be equitable.  In addition, comparing per capita consumption across 
households of different sizes does not allow for the impact of economies of scale that 
might exist. 
The third set of issues relate to what is left out of the measure of consumption 
itself.  The approach to calculating consumption draws on several modules of the survey.  
It calculates the value of food and nonfood items, including purchases, home-produced 
goods, and gifts received.  Imputed use values for owner-occupied housing and 
household durable goods are also calculated and included in the consumption measure.  
The only major items omitted from the consumption calculation are the value of publicly-
provided goods consumed by individuals or households (for example, the use of a public 
water tap, road infrastructure, or free health care services) and services provided within 
the household (e.g. child care, cooking, cleaning).  While these omissions are not 
uncommon for household surveys of this type, it is worth explicitly noting that the IAF 
data do not permit their quantification as part of the measure of consumption.   
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Finally, when constructing a measure of consumption it is important to factor in 
the variability of prices for agriculture products over the course of the year since they 
make up a high percentage of household expenditure.  These can range from simple 
during the post-harvest period to double or triple during the lean season up until the mid-
year harvest.  This is where the two surveys differed in methodology.  The bulk of data 
collection for urban areas in the 1996/7 IAF took place during January to June period 
when commodity prices would be higher.  As a result, food consumption aggregates had 
to be deflated using seasonal food price indices.  The 2002/3 IAF survey employed a 
method of data collection to account for seasonal price variations.  Data collection took 
place over the course of the entire year from July 2002 to June 2003.  The year was 
divided into quarters with one quarter of the interviews of each representative population 
sub-group conducted each quarter.  Organizing the data collection process this way was 
considered an improvement in methodology over the 1996/7 IAF (MPF/IFPRI/PU 2004).  
Nevertheless, a temporal food price index was developed for the survey period and used 
to adjust nominal values of food consumption.  It was assumed that nonfood prices did 
not vary temporally. 
As noted, the calculation of consumption consists of food and nonfood 
consumption.  For food consumption, the household was asked about what food was 
acquired, through what means, at what cost, in what amount, and how long this was 
expected to last.  This would then be normalized to reflect weekly average consumption 
before being divided by seven to get a daily amount.  The estimates for food consumption 
for each item were then aggregated for the household. 
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Nonfood consumption consists of direct expenditures reported by respondents 
during the interview process as well as imputed use values for certain items.  The IAF 
collected information on numerous consumable nonfood items ranging from clothing and 
footwear, cooking fuel, local transport, educational expenses, and domestic household 
items, among others.  Information was collected on the quantity purchased of each item 
and its cost.  Calculating the daily consumption value was done simply by dividing the 
number of days corresponding to the recall period.  For durable goods such as radios and 
bicycles that are consumed over a longer period, use value was calculated taking into 
account the asset’s replacement value, current condition, depreciation, and opportunity 
cost.  The other important category of nonfood consumption consists of housing costs.  
Actual rent paid was used when the household rented its primary dwelling.  In cases 
where the resident owned the dwelling, she was asked what she would pay to rent the 
house if she were to rent it out.  Finally, for households where no such data was available, 
a hedonic rental model was estimated using dwelling characteristics and actual self-
estimated rent drawn from the rest of the survey. The exact estimation methods for asset 
valuation and housing costs are described fully in MPF/UEM/IFPRI (1998).   
Social Attainment:  Level of Education 
A goal of this study is to complement an assessment of consumption growth by 
analyzing changes in the distribution of social attainment during the growth period.  
Unfortunately, while the surveys were consistent in their treatment of consumption over 
the two surveys, there were a number of differences in the coverage of non-income 
topics, thus limiting our choice of possible social indicators.  Furthermore, the plausible 
social indicators that remain are categorical, rather than continuous, variables rendering 
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the calculation of a “growth rate” between periods impossible.  As a result, this study will 
examine the absolute changes in levels of achievement of the chosen variable over the 
period or the actual levels of achievement in each period, rather than a growth rate. Based 
on a comparison of question structure in the two surveys an indicator of the level of 
education attained is chosen.   
It has been found in Mozambique that the education level of adults in the 
household, particularly adult females, is an important determinant for everything from the 
levels of household consumption to children’s nutrition to children’s enrollment in school 
(MPF/UEM/IFPRI 1998, 275-281).  The highest level of school completed is selected as 
the basis for the main education indicators used, which will be examined at both the 
individual and household levels.  Given that the impact of growth and progress of social 
attainment during the period between surveys is of interest, a focus on the 17-25 year old 
group in both periods will be taken as a reference for the analysis.   
The indicators come from the education sections of the principal questionnaires.  
Survey respondents seven years and older were first asked whether they had ever 
attended school before.  If they had, they were then asked:  “What it the highest level of 
school that [NAME] concluded?”  The answer choices were based on the levels of the 
Mozambican educational system and other schooling options provided by the state, as 
follows: (00) None, (01) Literacy Training, (02) EP1: Grammar school first level (up to 
grade 5), (03) EP2: Grammar school second level (grade 6 and 7), (04) ESG1: First cycle 
secondary school (grade 8 to 10), (05) ESG2: Second cycle secondary school (grade 11 
and 12), (06)  Technical School Elementary, (07) Technical School Basic, (08) Technical 
School Middle, (09) Teacher training, (10) Higher education, and (11) Other.   
 
42 
Some consolidation of the data was undertaken in the creation of variables. First, 
those that answered that they had never attended school showed up in the highest level 
completed data missing values.  Since never having attended school is equivalent to never 
having completed a level, these responses were recoded accordingly in the 1997 and 2003 
datasets.   
MPF/UEM/IFPRI (1998) note that in light of Mozambique’s tracked schooling 
system, the three levels of technical school are equivalent to EP2, ESG1, and ESG2, 
respectively.  Therefore, for simplification purposes given that there are very few 
responses in these categories, the answers corresponding to elementary, basic, and mid-
level technical school (06, 07, and 08) were folded into the answers for EP2, ESG1, and 
ESG2 (02, 03, and 04), respectively.  Similarly, there are few answers for Literacy (01) 
and Teacher Training (09).  These were folded into the None (00) and Higher Education 
(10) categories, respectively, although with less of an empirical basis than in the case of 
the technical school responses.  Other (11) was simply dropped.  On this basis, variables 
for the highest education level attained were created for all individuals and the 17-25 age 
group in both surveys.   
For purposes of examining educational attainment conditioned on consumption in 
the sprit of a conditional NIGIC, a household level indicator was created.  This was done 
for two reasons.  First, not much is gained by examining individual consumption given 
that it is simply derived from total household consumption by dividing across the number 
of household members and thus ignoring the intra-household allocation issues.  Second, 
Basu and Foster’s (1998) insights on the importance of the education of the best educated 
household member in the face of educational spillovers provides an approach that skirts 
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the issue of intra-household allocation. Thus, the education variable is collapsed to the 
household level on the maximum level of education attained by any member and 
compared across the survey periods.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Consumption 
 
 The growth incidence curve (GIC) calculated for Mozambique is shown in Figure 
1.  This depicts the average annual growth rate of consumption per capita between 1997 
and 2003 across percentiles of the population ordered by consumption.  The GIC shows 
that for every percentile of the population, growth in consumption has been positive. 
(Even the poorest households experienced 2 percent annual growth per capita.) Thus, 
growth in Mozambique was pro-poor according to the Ravallion and Chen (2003) 
definition of pro-poor growth or what Klasen (2005) refers to as “weak absolute” pro-
poor growth.  James, Arndt et al (forthcoming) draw the same conclusion about pro-poor 
growth in Mozambique based on the GIC.   
44 
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FIGURE 1 
 
GROWTH INCIDENCE CURVE FOR MOZAMBIQUE 
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 However, growth in Mozambique would not have been pro-poor if one were to 
adopt the Kakwani and Pernia (2000) definition in which the growth rates for the poor 
must exceed those of the non-poor.  Such pro-poor growth in the relative sense, as Klasen 
(2005) terms it, was not achieved as can be seen by the generally upward sloping trend of 
the GIC and the fact that overall national level GINI coefficient increased from .40 to .42 
(although not statistically significant), according to James, Arndt et al (forthcoming).  
Redistribution did not happen, although it would be difficult to defend this interpretation 
of pro-poor growth given how broad and deep poverty was and still is in Mozambique.  
As noted by Lopez (2004), one can conclude that Mozambique fits the typology of a 
high-poverty country in which an  emphasis on high growth has been appropriate even if 
it has meant a slight deterioration in inequality.   
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 While Mozambique remains a high poverty country with 54% of the population 
still living below the poverty line, an emphasis on growth and poverty reduction without 
regard to growing inequality is not a sustainable strategy as the poverty elasticity of 
growth will decrease over time.  In addition, as Birdsall (2004) cautions, the traditional 
focus on relative income inequality can often distract from growing absolute, or distance, 
inequality, which is often what fuels the perceptions of growing disparities.  This is a 
point that Ravallion (2003) also cites as a major factor in the acrimonious global debate 
on inequality and poverty.  
 At this stage in Mozambique’s development, the perspective provided here by the 
growth incidence curve, coupled with the decline in the various aggregate measures of 
the incidence, depth, and intensity of poverty cited earlier, is that growth in the income 
(consumption) dimension has indeed been pro-poor.  The next section examines whether 
developments in the social space of education reinforce this conclusion. 
Education 
 Mozambique’s post-war economic progress has been matched by considerable 
progress in rebuilding social, and particularly educational, infrastructure.  Intermediate 
indicators such as children in school, teachers employed, and grades completed all 
corroborate this trend.   
According to the IAF data analyzed here, educational enrollment jumped 
considerably between surveys.  The percent of the school age population (age 7 to 17) 
that had ever attended school increased from 61 to 80 percent at the national level and the 
proportion of this cohort that was attending school at the time of the survey also 
increased from 49 percent to 68 percent.  Looking further at the enrollment data, the 
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increase of 19 percentage points in rural areas (44 to 63 percent) exceeded that of 12 
points for urban areas (from 67 to 79 percent).  Given that poverty is higher in rural areas, 
these data give us our first hint of a progressive pattern of social attainment during the 
growth process.   However, while the rural-urban enrollment gap narrowed, it 
nevertheless remains large at 16 percentage points.  School attendance for girls also 
increased significantly from 43 to 65 percent compared to 54 to 71 percent rise for boys, 
narrowing the gender gap in enrollment.  The improvement in girls’ enrollment was 
particularly pronounced in rural areas where it jumped from 37 to 58 percent, a 57 
percent increase, between 1997 and 2003.   
 These results in enrollment are being translated into completed schooling overall, 
and specifically by the younger cohort.  As shown in Table 1, at the national level 82 
percent of individuals in 1997 had never completed the first level of primary school 
(EP1), equivalent to grades one through five.  This figure had dropped modestly to 79.7 
percent by 2003.  A more meaningful picture of improved attainment can be seen by the 
percent of 17-25 year olds in both surveys that had never completed a level of schooling.  
This dropped by almost seven percentage points from 70.4 percent to 63.6.  Whether 
measured for the population as a whole, or for the cohort that just completed its school 
years, the percent of individuals who had completed each level of schooling increased 
between 1997 and 2003.  Educational attainment is a slow moving indicator, but this is 
demonstrable progress.  While this is clearly progress in terms of social inclusion, 
Mozambique remains desperately poor in human capital terms and these data, it should 
be noted, do not give us any insight on the quality of education that is being attained. 
 
48 
TABLE 1 
  EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE (%) 
LEVEL All Individuals 
1997           2003 
17-25 Year Olds 
1997         2003 
None 82.03 79.69 70.45 63.61 
EP1 11.88 12.42 18.31 20.08 
EP2 4.49 5.27 8.33 11.91 
ESG1 1.15 1.63 2.36 3.18 
ESG2 0.39 0.88 0.54 1.17 
HigherEd. 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.05 
 The objective of an unconditional non-income growth incidence curve in this 
situation would be to capture the rate of growth in educational attainment across quantiles 
of the population ordered from least- to most-educated.  As noted earlier, the lumpiness 
of this data and the fact that educational level is categorical does not allow for the 
calculation of percentiles or growth rates.  However, the unconditional incidence can be 
inferred from Table 1 with a little imagination.  Consider instead the notion of quantiles 
of the population separated by the cutpoints associated with each level of education.  
Order the populations of 1997 and 2003 by educational levels from none to higher 
education.  Rather than a curve, one would have a stepped function with the first level 
representing no schooling completed.9  If growth in absolute educational attainment was 
pro-poor in the unconditional sense, the width of the first “level” associated with the 
percent of the population that had never completed a level would show a decline from 
70.4 percent to 63.6 percent.  The width associated with each subsequent level of 
education would show an increase reflecting the greater levels of attainment.  As such, 
the unconditional incidence of educational attainment could be said to have been pro-
poor in Mozambique between periods. 
                                                 
9 Unfortunately, quantile plots in STATA cannot carry analytical weights and thus simply reflect the 
distribution of the sample data and not the population. 
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 While the same data constraints (lumpiness, categorical social variable) inhibit the 
ability to construct a conditional non-income growth incidence curve, a kernel regression 
permits an approximation of one.  First, note again that the motivation is to see how 
educational attainment relates to consumption growth across the distribution.  Some of 
the pertinent questions we could consider with this information are:  Did those who were 
relatively poor in consumption increase their human capital stock? Did they do so at a 
faster or slower rate than the non poor?  As one advances up the income ladder, does 
educational attainment increase? 
 As discussed earlier, the level at which this analysis is conducted is the 
household.  The educational variable is the highest level of education in the household.  
The consumption variable is real consumption as a percent of the poverty line (ppl) for 
each period.  The first step in solving the problem of lumpiness was to redistribute the 
data so it was less skewed.  The logarithm of the consumption variable was calculated so 
that it would follow a normal distribution.  This allows educational attainment at lower 
levels of consumption, where much of the data is bunched, to be more easily ascertained.   
Data for both years is aligned at the poverty line (ppl=1), which is 0 on the x axis 
(ln(1)=0). 
 The next step was to do a kernel regression to smooth out the data and depict the 
essential relationship between the variables.  This type of nonparametric regression does 
not assume a specific functional form to the relationship of the data (Deaton 1997).  In 
other words, the data are allowed to shape the form of the functional relationship between 
the variables.  Kernel estimation is based on calculating bands of local moving averages 
around values of x.  Unfortunately, the kernel regression function in STATA also does 
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not allow for the use of sample weights and thus would give an inaccurate picture of the 
relationship between education and consumption in the population.  A solution to this 
problem was to blow up the dataset to the level of the population (approximately 18 
million in 2003) using sample weights and then run the regression.  Unfortunately, RAM 
memory limitations did not permit running the regressions on the dataset expanded by the 
full population weights.  Instead the population weight was divided by ten for the 
expansion so that the final “population” on which the regression was run was 1.8 million 
as opposed to 18 million.10 
 A growth incidence curve would calculate and plot the growth (in absolute or 
relative terms) in the social variable at each point along ordered population percentiles of 
consumption.  Since categorical percentiles cannot be calculated, the approach used here 
does not calculate the growth between points of each year.  It instead overlays the kernel 
regression lines for 1997 and 2003.  The general slope of each line and their relationship 
to each other in terms of which dominates at each point on the x axis, the distance 
between them for a given level of consumption, and the rightward shift of the 2003 line 
are relevant for assessing the improvement in educational attainment by income levels 
over time.  The following figure shows these results: 
                                                 
10 Comparison of weighted and unweighted regressions, in the end, did not appear drastically different from 
one another. 
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FIGURE 2 
KERNEL REGRESSION OF EDUCATION ON 
CONSUMPTION
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 It is important to note something about the distribution of households depicted in 
this figure.  While the process of logging consumption helped clarify what is going on at 
the lower end of the distribution, it does so at the expense of a true rendering of the actual 
proportion of households along the x axis.  The poverty line is depicted at 0 on the x axis, 
so recall that the headcount poverty rate in 1997 was 69 percent and in 2003 it is 54 
percent.  This provides an understanding of what proportion of the household distribution 
is to the left of 0 for each line.  Thus, a weakness of this depiction is that more data points 
go into drawing the line between -1 and 1 (or -2 and 2) than go into drawing other parts 
of the line (the tails).  (A way to compensate for this would be to use percentiles of 
consumption along the x axis, but this would lose information about consumption growth 
that is shown here.) 
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 With the above caveats in mind, the first feature of this figure is that each line is 
generally upward sloping indicating that households with higher levels of consumption 
usually possess a member with a higher level of education.  Second, if the 2003 line was 
everywhere above the 1997 line, it could be said that there has been growth in 
educational attainment across all consumption levels.  However, the lines cross showing 
that there are sections of the consumption distribution where educational attainment 
declined. However, some of these areas are near x = +2 to +5 which is the end of the 
distribution in which we have less confidence.  (A wider bandwidth on that portion of the 
distribution would probably result in better tracking of the lines.) 
 Starting with the poorest of the poor (x = -3 to -2), it appears that there has been a 
decline in educational attainment.  Moving from x = -2 to the poverty line (where a 
majority of data points are clustered), the 2003 line for the most part dominates 1997 
suggesting that there has been growth in educational attainment for this class of the poor.  
If this difference is indeed significant, it would suggest that education spending has had 
an impact on the poor and thus has been socially inclusive.  However, the general flatness 
of the lines suggests that overall there is not a lot of human capital accumulation here as 
higher levels of education aren’t leading to higher levels of income.  Another 
interpretation of these data suggests a possible threshold effect of education at the 
completion of EP1, the first cycle of primary (y = 2).   
 In conclusion, from both the adapted unconditional and conditional analysis it can 
be concluded that growth in Mozambique has in all likelihood been pro-poor in this 
particular aspect of the non-income dimension.  More people are entering the school 
system and completing a level in 2003 than in 1997 and completion rates are rising at 
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every level of education.  In general, most households below the poverty line saw 
positive growth in their maximum education levels.  However, the data would indicate 
that the poorest of households lost ground over the last six years and this would be an 
important issue for further study and remedy.   
These overall patterns are consistent with what would have been expected given 
the findings of Heltberg, Simler et al (2001) referenced earlier in regard to the 
progressive pattern of government spending on EP1 and the large proportion of rural 
areas that received social infrastructure spending.  Furthermore, that study also concluded 
that the pattern of public service spending would reduce inequality relative to the 
distribution of consumption.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This study sought to assess the degree to which economic growth in Mozambique 
has been pro-poor according to various definitions in the literature and in both income 
and non-income dimensions.  The growth incidence curve of consumption shows that 
growth has indeed been pro-poor in the weak absolute sense.  Average annual increases 
in household consumption per capita were above two percent for every percentile of the 
population.  It is this steady and broad based growth that has contributed to the significant 
decline in headcount poverty from 69 to 54 percent between 1997 and 2003.  Measures of 
the depth and intensity of poverty have also declined at the national level while inequality 
has increased slightly.  While consumption growth in Mozambique has not been pro-poor 
by the relative definition, it is concluded consistent with the observations in the literature 
that this might not be an appropriate metric for a high poverty country like Mozambique.  
However, this study does caution against overlooking a growth pattern that increases 
inequality. 
 Growth in the non-income dimension of education has also been pro-poor, 
according to conclusions drawn from the methodology used here.  As a result of the 
natural progression of post-war recovery and strong public interventions in rehabilitating 
and expanding the educational system, fewer Mozambicans of all ages in 2003 have 
never completed a level of schooling.  This drop over the entire population is driven by 
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the age group of 17 to 25 year olds in 2003 that passed through the educational system 
during the period between surveys.  In the spirit of the unconditional non-income growth 
incidence curves developed by Klasen (2005), the distribution of educational attainment 
by population quantiles was pro-poor.  The relationship between consumption growth and 
maximum educational levels of households is also pro-poor. In general, most households 
below the poverty line saw positive growth in their maximum education levels.  
However, the data would indicate that the poorest of households lost ground over the last 
six years.  Determining the nature and characteristics of these households and 
determining why they have not been reached by the education system should be a priority 
for the government. 
 Income and non-income growth incidence curves are important new tools that 
have become available for the measurement and assessment of pro-poor growth at a time 
when development practitioners and policy makers are keenly interested in measures of 
progress toward the Millennium Development Goals.  While this study was able to 
produce a growth incidence curve, it encountered severe limitations in developing non-
income growth incidence curves for important areas like health, education, and access to 
clean water due to the inconsistency of the IAF questionnaires between the two periods.  
Some questions on social indicators were dropped from the second survey or the answer 
structure was changed from a cardinal to an ordinal measure.  Simple changes to future 
surveys that ensured consistency and greater use of cardinal measures would remedy this 
problem, providing government and researchers with the ability to calculate non-income 
growth incidence curves.  For example, the more comprehensive 1996-97 IAF included 
data on vaccination coverage, years of schooling, and nutrition that yielded continuous 
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variables which were dropped or possibly moved to other government surveys.  A useful 
exercise for the next IAF would be to revisit the 1996-97 IAF and examine which of 
these questions might be repeated in future IAFs in order to produce non-income growth 
incidence curves in areas of interest.  This would also provide a longer period of time 
over which to assess the pro-poorness of growth, which is important in many non-income 
dimensions given that changes in social attainment (e.g., education levels) take time to 
accumulate.   
Finally, this study did not seek to answer the question of what policy or other 
factors might have contributed to the pro-poorness of growth beyond reference to 
previous studies of the incidence of social expenditures.  Exploration of the causes of 
pro-poor growth in Mozambique is another area of potential future research.  
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